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o WHITHER THE CARIBBEAN EXODUS? "337 most anglophone countries in the region as well as Suriname (formerly Dutch Guiana) achieved nationhood.
During this period of economic and social transformation, most Caribbean countries lost a large proportion of their populations through migration. Indeed their integration into the world economy occurred both at the local level (through changing patterns of production and adaptation to technology and markets) and abroad (through the absorption of the Caribbean labour surplus into the economies of the Northern metropoles where so many Caribbean emigrants settled).
In this postwar period, definite advances were achieved in the health and educational fields. Standards of living increased in most countries during the 1950s and the 1960s, although in the 1970s and 1980s about one-half of the countries in the region experienced either economic stagnation or decline. Nevertheless, after some forty years of effort to change the colonial economic order, and despite some achievements, no country in the region, nor the region as a whole, has developed a truly diversified economy. Caribbean economies remain very dependent on a narrow range of specialized niches -tourism, offshore business services, tropical fruits, for example -within the global economy. Some of the smaller countries have been very successful in exploiting these niches, but many of the other Caribbean countries are fighting poor economic performances, budget deficits, and balance of payments problems.
Today, most Caribbean countries face two related challenges: first, structural adjustment, or how to maintain income in a rapidly changing global economy; second, the development of trade blocs, or how to deal with the powerful trade blocs emerging in Europe and North America. How will the Caribbean region and individual Caribbean countries integrate into the new world economy? Will standards of living fall or remain stagnant, as has been the case in many countries over the past ten to fifteen years? Will income and social conditions improve as they did in some of the smaller countries of the region over the same period? Bearing in mind that emigration from the region played a huge role 75  790 UN  433  604  378  299  135  163  189  178  47 8  217  374 E  274  1,017  1,954  706   446 E  366 UN  93  2,089 UN  748  865  759  378  229  210  357  250  695  313  543 UN  395  2,133  3,449  3,522   1,427 UN  1,218 UN  292  4,935 UN  1,228  6,048  3,350  747  744  584  942  676  1,383  920  1,990 UN  1,181  3,475  10,933  7,476   NA  830  370  NA  1500  3610  6540  330  2190  1720  1900  2210  4600  3330  6800  1990 II Gross domestic product per capita: The data presented here for most countries are taken from the World Bank EPD Data Bank (1986). In the absence of World Bank data, the data have been estimated (E) or taken (UN) from the United Nations Statistical Yearbooks (the 1981 Yearbook for 1960 and 1970 , and the 1985 / 86 Yearbook for 1980 . It should be noted that for Cuba, all figures are crude estimates (i.e., the 1980 figure refers to the net material product divided by the rate of exchange of the Cuban peso given by the UN and the mid-year population.
. in its post-World War II transformation, how will future emigration be affected by either successful or unsuccessful integration?
No one has the perfect crystal ball for forecasting the future, but the trends of the 1990s point to several strong hypotheses. The present economic niches (tourism, offshore banking, tax havens, and such) have their limitations and cannot serve as major sources of revenue for all the Caribbean countries. Most of these countries must therefore continue to try to adapt to the new world economy -at varying paces depending on their past development and economic performance. Population movements are likely to continue to play an important role in that process. But there are likely to be substantial variations from country to country in the magnitude, the type, and even the direction of these migrations.
T H E C A R I B B E A N E X O D U S
The loss of population due to net migration out of the Caribbean region during the 1980s has now been calculated at about 1.4 mi1lion.I This is somewhat less than the I .7-million loss estimated for the 1970s.~ It thus appears that the net migration from the region between 1950 and 1990 totals 5.6 million. This figure is equal to 32 per cent of the region's population in 1950, and 16 per cent of its population in 1990. No other region of the world experienced such heavy losses from sustained emigration during this period.
As might be expected, the larger absolute losses through outmigration are generally found to be from the countries with the larger populations, but there are some aberrations. Overall, the major sending countries are Haiti and Jamaica, with losses of about one million each over the past forty years, followed by Puerto Rico (about 800,000), Cuba and the Dominican Republic (about 700,000 each), then Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago (about 300,000). Looking at migration rates, a different picture emerges. The highest rates belong to five small Commonwealth Caribbean (Caricom) states: the four Windward Islands -Grenada, Saint Vincent, Saint Lucia, and Dominica -and Saint Kitts-Nevis. For these countries, net migration losses between 1950 and 1990 represent more than 80 per cent of their 1950 populations. In fact all of the thirteen Caricom countries, with the exception of the Bahamas -one of the few countries with a net migration gain over the period -were severely.affected. The weighted rate of migration loss for Caricom countries stands at a high 62 per cent of the 1950 population compared with 32 per cent for the Caribbean region as a whole.
Caribbean migration has been massively directed to the Northern metropoles, mainly to the United States and Canada.
The European metropoles -the United Kingdom, France, and the Netherlands -have received less than one million Caribbean migrants over the past forty years.3 The movement to the United Kingdom was limited to British subjects from what were then that country's Caribbean colonies; it began after the Second World War and was terminated in 1962.4 The movements to France and the Netherlands have been restricted to holders of French and Dutch passports from the French and the Dutch Antilles and from French Guiana and Suriname (which became independent in 1g75).5 In contrast, the United States and Can-ada have admitted 2.7 million legal immigrants from all Caribbean countries, mainly since the mid-1960s. If Puerto Rican emigration to the United States is added to this total,6 we can say that about 3.5 million 'documented' Caribbean migrants have settled in North America.
Compared with the magnitude of emigration from the region, intra-Caribbean migration appears minor. A plausible estimate of intra-Caribbean migration (based on a permanent change of residence) is around half a million for the past forty years.7 This is about double the number of Caribbean-born individuals who were found in a 1980 enumeration to be living in a Caribbean country other than their country of birth. Such an estimate would mean that intra-Caribbean population movement formed about IO per cent of the overall Caribbean migration during the past forty years. Moreover, the countries of origin and destination for these migrants are restricted to only a few states in the region. Haiti is the main provider of intra-Caribbean migrants, even though the majority of Haitian emigrants go to North America.s The next major source of intra-Caribbean migrants are the four Windward Islands, but here, too, the pattern is the same: multiple countries of destination but with a majority going to the United States and Canada.
Only a handful of Caribbean countries have registered net migration gains over the past forty years as a result of intraregional movements. These are, in descending order of increase: the Bahamas, French Guiana, the United States Virgin Islands, Sint Maarten, the Cayman Islands, the British Virgin Islands, and the Turks and Caicos Islands. Generally, the influx of Ca- 
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dribbean migrants to these countries has accompanied a substantial immigration from the metropoles.
T H E D E T E R M I N A N T S O F E M I G R A T I O N
The population movements I have outlined were prompted by a variety of factors, whose relative importance has differed over time. Previous research designed to explain Caribbean emigration rates between 1950 and 1980, using a regression model, identified five independent variables.9 Three, variables were measures of economic opportunity in the Caribbean: (I) the percentage of the labour force in the agricultural sector at the beginning of each decade, which provided an indication of variations in levels of development and conditions 'pushing' people to seek opportunities elsewhere; (2) gross domestic product per capita at the beginning of each decade, providing a crude meas-,Ure of national wealth and of the capacity to provide employment and income at home; and (3) change in the percentage of agricultural workers during the decade, as an indicator of the pressure on internal labour markets to accept workers shifting from the agriculture sector to the services or industrial sector. The other two -variables were selected to take account of the effect on migration movements of, first, international community and kinship linkages and, second, national immigration rules. This was done after a simple qualitative assessment through the selection of two dummy variables: ( I ) 'link,' reflecting the importance 'of previous movements and the consequent sizeable expatriate community, I o and (2) 'access,' reflecting free versus regulated access to the main receiving countries. Antilles, and Puerto Rico, and 'o' for the large Spanish and French Creole-speaking countries: Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti. I I 'Access' was coded 'I' for countries with privileged access in a given decade or '0 ' for countries with controlled access to any metropolitan destination over the decade.
The model using these five variables explains 69 per cent of the variation in net migration rates over the 1970s for the 2 1 countries with net migration losses during the 1950-1980 period.IZ If one excludes Curaçao and Aruba -whose emigration patterns are largely shaped by the fortunes and misfortunes of their giant oil refineries -the model explains 73 per cent of the variance for the remaining I g countries. Interestingly enough, when using only three variables -percentage of the labour force in agriculture, gross domestic product per capita, and 'link,"s the R-square (corrected for degrees of freedom) is only slightly less: 0.66 against 0.73. The reason for this is fairly straightforward: all three measures of economic opportunity are inter-correlated, such that inclusion of all three helps increase the Rsquare only slightly. But whereas dropping the variable 'change in percentage of labour force in agriculture' has virtually no impact on the results, dropping either 'percentage of labour force in agriculture' or 'gross domestic product per capita' has a major impact in reducing the variance explained. When one or the other of these two variables is dropped, it appears that retaining 'percentage of labour force in agriculture' provides the highest result. This is particularly true for the 1 2 Caricom countries which experienced net migration losses during the 1970s. In their case, 'percentage of labour force in agriculture in 1970' only explains 59 per cent of the variation in net migration rates between these countries! Indeed, the decline in the agriculture sector in the Caribbean over the past forty years -both in plantation and peasant agriculture'l -is a key factor in explaining the timing and mag- 13 'Link' and 'access' as they were coded appeared to be very similar, and inter- N O T E : Migration balances: The migration balances presented here represent the difference between the expected population without migration at the end of the decade considered (obtained by adding the population at the beginning of the decade and the natural increase observed or estimated during the decade) and the estimated actual population at the end of the decade or at the beginning of the next decade.
nitude of the Caribbean exodus to the metropoles. In countries where the absence of subsistence agriculture offered few alternatives for agricultural workers faced with a deterioration in earnings and employment conditions on the plantations, massive emigration started early. Puerto Rico and Montserrat are typical examples. But in countries with a sizeable peasantry at the end of World War II, such as the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Dominica, Grenada, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent, Guyana, and Belize, emigration only developed later when the crisis in the plantation sector deepened , making subsistence agriculture more precarious, and when the first groups of emigrants in the metropoles facilitated further emigration. Though very useful in providing a better understanding of the determinants of Caribbean migration, this regression model has several shortcomings. First, it was designed only for countries experiencing net and massive emigration. Second, it is not relevant for those countries which have never had a significant agricultural sector, or whose agricultural sector has long since disappeared. Third; it tends to play down the importance of external factors, such as the immigration regulations of the receiving countries and the role of the diasporas in the dynamics of migration.
T H E C A R I B B E A N I N T H E N E W I N T E R N A T I O N A L D I V I S I O N O F L A B O U R
The elimination or marginalization of Caribbean agricultural workers and peasants should be interpreted as a further step in the integration of the Caribbean countries, and the Caribbean as a whole, into the global economy. In the new international division of labour, the Caribbean occupies an ambiguous place. ' 5 It has some relative advantages for the development of certain services activities: tourism, offshore banking, and such. But it is not really an attractive place for investments in offshore industrial activities for a variety of reasons including higher salary levels than in other Third World countries, a less docile labour force, and, in several countries, especially those with low wages, political instability. Indeed, the major relative advantage of the Caribbean is its reasonably well trained and healthy work force. Since the early movements within the Caribbean Basin (to Panama, Cuba, and so on) and to the United States in the latter part of the nineteenth century, the people of the Caribbean had developed a 'culture' of migration. I6 They were therefore ready to enter the American and Canadian labour markets when these two countries needed workers and opened their doors to immigration from the Third World in the 1960s.
However the integration of the Caribbean into the North American economy through the incorporation of its labour surplus from the agricultural sector is uneven. Haiti is the most characteristic example of incomplete integration. First, about two-thirds of its labour force still works in agriculture, mainly at the subsistence 1evel.lY Second, most of the adult population is illiterate. Third, despite the volume of the emigration from Haiti, net emigration since 1950 still represents a low percentage of the resident population by Caribbean standards -18 per cent. Yet, even here, the integration process is proceeding. In the I 970s, manufacturing activities developed in free zones around Port-au-Prince to take advantage of the low wages and lack of safety and social protection. Primary school enrolment, mainly through private institutions, has increased significantly over the past two decades. Finally, even though they are latecomers in the Caribbean exodus, the Haitians now constitute the largest group of Caribbean emigrants. However, in 1980 the number of legal immigrants in the receiving countries who were born in Haiti was small compared with the total net migration loss since 1950.'~ This means that most Haitians -between 65 and 75 per centare illegal migrants in the countries in which they reside, particularly in the United States, their main destination.
By contrast, Barbados is among a number of anglophone Lastly, the Bahamas and the United States Virgin Islands are examples of countries which successfully took advantage of new economic niches. Therefore their integration into the international economy has been achieved primarily through the development of tourism and other services, and not through the export of labour. Over the past forty years, both countries have registered massive immigration from other Caribbean countries and from the metropoles. But this migration peaked in the 1960s and has since declined. In fact, during the 1980s, the United States Virgin Islands recorded a massive net emigration because of the end of the hotel building boom and a slowdown in the tourism sector. Despite positive migration balances, both these countries nevertheless lost sizeable numbers of emigrants to the American labour market over the past forty years.
S M A L L I S N O T O N L Y B E A U T I F U L , I T IS A L S O B E T T E R
The uneven integration of the Caribbean economies into the global economy is reflected in huge differences in gross domestic product per capita: from a mere US$300 or US$400 for Haiti . * and Guyana to more than US$~o,ooo for Bermuda, the Bahamas, the United States Virgin Islands, the French Antilles, and some other small islands. Recent levels of performance for Caribbean economies are also diverse and reflect the success or failure of their efforts to benefit from a mixed international environment and to adjust to the emerging new international division of labour.
Interestingly, the smaller countries have fared much better than the larger ones. The smallest countries of Caricom -the Windward Islands, Antigua, Saint Kitts-Nevis, Montserrat, Belize, and the Bahamas as well as the British Virgin Islands and Anguilla -were foremost among the high-growth economies, recording rates in excess of 5 per cent a year between 1981 and 1990.~9 This success was due largely to vibrant and growing tourism industries coupled with, in the case of the Windwards, good results in the banana sector. By contrast, during the 1980s the economies of the larger countries either contracted (Guyana, Haiti, and Trinidad and Tobago) or experienced low growth rates of o to 2 per cent a year (Barbados, the Dominican Republic, and Suriname) or, at best, moderate growth rates of 2 to 3 per cent a year (Jamaica, Cuba, and Puerto Rico).zo The lower economic growth in the larger countries is surprising because they have relatively diversified economies and often possess a substantial manufacturing sector.
Taking into consideration population growth and inequality of income distribution, these statistics suggest that at least in the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Suriname, and the 'most developed countries' of Caricom (Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, and Guy- ana, and perhaps most recently Barbados), people have become poorer in recent years. In the other countries of the Caribbean, the economic growth of the 1980s has meant a substantial increase in gross domestic product per capita. In a number of small economies devoted to tourism and offshore business services, such as Bermuda, the Bahamas, the Cayman Islands, and the British Virgin Islands, gross domestic product per capita is now above U S $~o , o o o .~~ In countries with little or no tourism, such as the Windward Islands and Belize, it is around US$2,000.
During the 1980s, most of the countries with poor or modest economic performances have had to implement severe structural adjustment programmes imposed by international financial institutions. The measures governments adopted -a lowering of expenditures on social services, a reduction (and sometimes elimination) of subsidies for basic consumer goods, and a steady devaluation of their currencies which increased the prices of imported (basic and other) commodities -have made life worse for most of their people. Likewise, debt servicing has been a constant drain on the foreign exchange earnings of these countries, reducing the level of investment as well as growth potential. Governments have thus been forced to divert resources away from local expenditure, resulting in disproportionate cuts to social services. Guyana and Jamaica suffered particularly severely from externally imposed adjustment programmes. For the most part the faster growing economies have been spared the debilitating effects of externally imposed programmes. But many of them have undertaken self-imposed adjustment programmes to adapt their fiscal operations to levels dictated by adverse international economic development. During the 1980s, many of these countries achieved surpluses on their current account, which enabled them to undertake social infrastructure and other investment projects. The emphasis was more on productive capital expenditure and slightly less on social investment. Thus, the programmes may have resulted in a slight shift in the balance away from social infrastructure. However for these countries, on average, government expenditures on health and education remained roughly constant.
Despite the varying economic performances of Caribbean countries, virtually all of them experienced dramatic increases in their unemployment rates.z2 This has even been the case for countries which had massive emigration rates. Indeed, one major consequence of the integration process at work over the past two or three decades has been to make increasing numbers of Caribbean workers available for external labour markets -mainly in the metropoles, but also in the 'new niche' economies of the region.
What then is likely to be the impact of the emergence of two major trading blocs -tbe European Community's single market and the North American free trade area -on the Caribbean economies and on migration from the Caribbean?
I N B E T W E E N . T H E T W O B L O C S
The Caribbean is already an economic battlefield for these two blocs. The French and Dutch authorities have long tried to use 'their' respective Antilles as ports of redistribution for their goods and services, not only to the rest of the Caribbean but also to the North American and Latin American markets. American shipping and airlines companies use Puerto Rico as a base for exporting their products in the region, and Puerto Rico's airport has become a compulsory transit stop for many North American tourists going to other Caribbean destinations, including the French and the Dutch Antilles. Moreover, a newly established direct air link between Puerto Rico and Europe is likely to provide increasing competition for the European airlines which bring tourists from Europe to the Caribbean.
The 'banana war' is another example of the confrontation of Turning to the manufacturing sector of the Caribbean economy, the prospects for its three components -agro-processing, import substitution, and the enclave sector -are not promising.23 The agro-processing sector constitutes a potentially strong base for the industrial development of the region, but it is characterized at the moment by varying degrees of efficiency because of primitive technology and the variability of the quality of the inputs. The import-substitution sector, geared to local and regional markets, is characterized by a high level of imported content in the production process. The World Bank asserts that this sector is highly uncompetitive and can only survive with extremely high tariff protection. Lastly, the enclave sector is dominated by foreign garment and highly specialized electronics firms. They export mainly to the United States and are competitive in the global market. But enclave manufacturing firms can be a source of uncertainty in the orderly development of an industrial sector. These firms are inclined to move frequently seeking advantage and they cater to very volatile export markets where recession and technological changes can decimate the sector in a short space of time. They also employ mainly female workers at low wages, workers who may be more and more 23 Samuel, 'Socio-economic scenario for the Eastern Caribbean.' The continuing integration of the Caribbean region into the global economy over the past fifteen to twenty years has resulted in an increased vulnerability for the Caribbean economies. Even though several countries in the region have been very effective in taking advantage of new economic niches, these successes are fragile. Moreover, similar developments cannot be envisaged for all countries of the region, especially the larger ones. Competition within the region between the two international trading blocs may create new opportunities for economic development in certain countries, but probably at the expense of other countries in the region. This competition may also work to the disadvantage of the region, as the controversy over Caribbean banana production demonstrates.
Increased economic vulnerability is likely to go hand in hand with increased mobility for people, a logical outcome of increased international economic integration. Population movement in the region is likely to be diverse as well and to pose new challenges to both receiving and sending countries.
For the countries with a substantial percentage of their labour force still in the agricultural sector, emigration will continue, whatever the immigration policies in the potential receiving countries may be. The numbers of emigrants from Haiti and the Dominican Republic are likely to be much higher than the numbers the receiving countries are prepared to accept. Severe tensions between countries and within the receiving communities can be expected. However, the need for unskilled labour, both in the more developed countries of the region and in the United States and Canada, may help to reduce these tensions. The future of Cuban migration is difficult to predict, but any changes in the present regime are likely to lead to large numbers of Cuban emigrants. For those countries which have already lost many emigrants to North America, emigration will continue to be a mobility strategy for many youths, irrespective of the economic performance of the sending or the receiving country. And for many of the earlier Caribbean emigrants a permanent or temporary return home will be an increasingly attractive option. This is true both for those still of working age and for those who have retired and possess an American or Canadian pension.
